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Proposal of a Concept and Reliability Analysis for a Fusion Plant Magnet 
Protection System 
Abstract 
The W7m!ailability for the current switch down in case of a demandin the magnet coils of a 
.fusion demonstrationplant must be decreased by a .few orders of magnitude as compared to 
the one of experimental facilities. The sajety requirements to prevent initiation of event 
sequences which might Iead to the release o.f radioactivity and energy by the plant must be 
fu(filled with the same standards as applied in a normally applicable plant. On the basis of 
this proven technology a generat usable magnet protection system will be proposed, which 
achieves some considerable improvements in the failure detectability as compared to the 
conventional protection systems. lt will be demonstrated by fault tree analysis that the prin-
cipal demands on sa.fety can be sati~fied by that approach. The improvements are achieved by 
the use of an additional microprocessor supported system for failure detection without being 
used for initiation of any safety related actions. An influence on a safety action by the 
additional system therefore is excluded. 
Konzeptvorschlag und Zuverlässigkeitsanalyse für ein Fusionsanlagen-Mag-
net-Schutzsystem 
Kurzfassung 
Die Nichtvel:fligbarkeit der Stromabschaltung in den Magnetspulen bei Anforderung in einer 
Demonstrations-Fusionsanalage mz{ß, gegenüber den Experimentieran/agen, um mehrere 
Größenordnungen reduüert werden. Die Sicherheitsanforderungen zur Vermeidung der Aus-
lösungen von Ereignisabläufen, die zur Freisetzung von Energie und Radioaktivität führen, 
sind mit den gleichen Maßstäben zu beurteilen wie bei den existierenden Anlagen. Auf der 
Basis dieser erprobten Technologie wird ein allgemein einsetzbares lvfagnet-Schutzsystem 
vmgeschlagen, das gegenüber den vorhandenen Schutzsystemen über eine wesentlich gestei-
gerte Fehlererkennungs-Fähigkeit verfügt. Anhand einer Fehlerbaum-Analyse wird der 
Nachweis erbracht, daß die grundsätzlichen Anforderungen erfüllt werden. Die Verbesserun-
gen basieren hauptsächlich auf einem zusätzlichen, mikroprozessor gestützten System zur 
Fehlerdetektion, das aber selbst keine Sicherheitsaufgaben wahrnimmt. Eine Einflt(ßnahme 
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lntroduction 
Reliability analysis of a current switch down in case of a demand in the magnet coils 
of the large experimental facilities results in unavailability values in the order of 
magnitude of 1 Q-3 per demand. The safety relevant risk connected with non switch 
down is relatively low, and is mainly related to darnage of the experimental facility. 
Radioactivity is not involved, so that a radioactivity release is excluded from the 
beginning. 
This situationwill change in case of e.g. iTER. On the one hand the possibility of an 
energy release is much higher, because of the high amount of energy handled and 
stored. On the other hand the possibility of a radioactivity release mainly by the 
Tritium (T) and contamination of highly loaded parts of the plant cannot be 
neglected. These risk factors require precautions according to the ones in conven-
tional fission energy generation technology (state of the art). The values of unavail-
ability for interruption of the energy production process in case of a demand in the 
warst case, are there in the order of magnitude of 1 o-6 to 1 o-7 per demand or even 
lower. A probability for darnage of the plant and contamination of the neighbourhood 
is not to be neglected in case of fusion. The safety precautions for a fusion plant 
shall be sirnilar to conventional nuclear plants, therefore, oparational experience for 
fusion plants which forms the basis for actual safety evaluations is necessary. 
Three Ieveis of precautions contribute mainly to a high Ievei of safety standards. 
1. The plant protection system must be a fully independent autonomaus system in 
relation to the operation system. The signal generation and signal processing of a 
plant protection system must not be influenced by other systems. 
2. The design and the Iay-out principle for achieving sufficiently low unavailability 
values are redundancy and diversity. This holds also in the safety equipment as 
weil as in the working principles of the measuring and processing equipment and 
in the process variables itself. This is a very strict requirement and can only be 
achieved with a high amount of precautions. 
3. An effective quality assurance (QA) system including administrative precautions 
need to be established. 
- 3 -
System description 
One can proceed from the working hypothesis, that a protection system in a fusion 
facility should follow the same safety demands and precautions that are valid in a 
conventional fission power plant. Therefore the regulations established by the 
Nuclear Safety Standards Commission (Kerntechnischer Ausschuß (KTA)) in that 
field will be briefly described. Fig. 1 gives an example of the functional design of a 
protection system [1 ]. 
The system can be 
divided into three 
functional Ieveis. 
1. The initiation Ievei 
is responsible for 
the signal genera-
tion of the safety 
relevant process 
variables to process 
a safety variable. A 
Iimit value of that 
safety variable is a 
criterion for further 
actions and trans-
mitted as initiation 
signal to the logic 
Ievei. This process 
is always performed 
with a high degree 
of redundancy. 
2. ln the logic Ievei 
these redundant 
initiation signalswill 
be compared with 
initiation criteria 
(according to the 2 
INITIATION CHANNEL A INITIATION CHANNEL B 
Process Variable A Process Variable B 




I LOGICAL COINCIDENCE CIRCUITRY I 
lnitiatto
1
n Criterion LOGIC LEVEL 
Actuation Signal 
Operational Contra! Signal 
CONTROL LEVEL 
INDIVIDUAL DRIVE CONTROL 
Actuation Signal 
Fig. 1 Definitions in the protection system according to the 
Nuclear Safety Standards Commission (KT A) Regulation 
KTA-3501 [1] 
out of 3 or 2 out of 4 principle). lf a particular criterion is fulfilled an actuating 
signal is given to the control Ievei. 
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3. On the control Ievei, the actuation signal can be overruled by an additional priority 
control. This is necessary because on demand of several safety actions a priority 
ranking must decide about the highest priority. The outputwill be an actuation of a 
safety action. 
The reference [1] prescribes, that this signal generation and signal processing 
pertaining to the protection system has to be completely independent from other 
signals and other systems, e.g. the normal operation system. 
A plant protection system according to these safety regulations (as also used in the 
conventional jission reactor technology), but with additional capabilities will be 
recommended for fusion plants The principle of the design is given in Fig. 2. 
The basic concept is, 
that the plant protec-
tion system is inde-
pendent ~om the 
plant operation sys-
tem as already poin-
ted out. The plant pro-
tection system itself is 
part of a global safety 
system which also 




are, e.g. safety valves 
or safety switches etc. 
Passive safety pre-
cautions are, e.g. Iay-
outs, Iimitation of 
power ratings and 
others. The active and 
passive precautions 
PLANT PROTECTION SYSTEM 
SIGNAL LOGIC INITIATION OF 
SENSOR PROCESSING EVALUATION SAnY ACTIONS 
PLANT OPERATION SYSTEM 
are dependent on the FIG. 2 PRINCIPLE OF THE PLANT PRO-
design in detail but in TECTION SYSTEM 
the present early design phase not part of the considerations. 
ACTION 
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quench, is given in Fig. 3. A quench is the transition from the super conducting state 
to the normal conducting state in a magnet coil. The quench as an initiation criterion 
is selected as a representative example. The system under consideration is of com-
mon interest for all of the safety relevant events in a fusion plant, e.g. switch down of 
the current in a neutral beam injector (NBI) etc. 
Back to the reference example. One of the plant variables for quench detection in a 
super conducting magnet system is the current in the conductor coils. An abnormal 
change of the current is a measure for the quench. This current will be permanently 
monitared by detectors. The resulting analog signals will be amplified and processed 
in redundant analog processing units. Independent single failures in the measuring 
and in the processing channels will be supervised by comparators arranged between 
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the redundant channels. ln case of a signal difference of a few % an alarm signal is 
generated. 
ln this arrangement each channel is controlled by two comparators. The individual 
signal is also surveyed by Iimit values. ln case of exceeding a Iimit value an initiation 
signal according to the description in Fig. 1 is transmitted to the logic part of the 
system. The analog part of the signal processing is identical to the conventional 
protection system according to [1 ). The advantage is, that the essentially fix wired 
system possesses a very low unavailability in case of a demand. The disadvantage 
is, the system is only able to supervise minimum or maximum values, respectively. 
The values could also represent gradients or values dependent on other parameters, 
but it is always a single value. The necessary precautions against the Common 
Mode situation are very demanding and mainly based on administrative precautions 
and an extensive quality assurance. 
One of the most serious Common Mode failures in the protection system, is the 
miscalibration of redundant measuring channels, because there is a large influence 
by the human activity involved which is very difficult to quantify. This Common Mode 
problem is discussed more in detail in the Appendix A. The problern of Common 
Modes caused by human actions was also a dominating part in the considerations of 
WASH-1400 [2] and the results arewill be incorporated. 
A new feature in the present concept is an additional microprocessor based signal 
processing in every redundant channel. The problem of using microprocessors in 
safety systems arises from the difficulty to guarantee the required Ievei of reliability. 
lf however the system is not used for initiation of a safety action but for error detec-
tion only, the reliability in view of the Common Modeproblem may be improved in an 
acceptable manner. This is recommended in the case under consideration. 
The system can be mainly used for: 
- Detection of Common Modes 
- Detection of plant conditions which show a tendency towards a fault or critical 
situation 
- Detection of dependent failures 
- Detection of sensor failures by on line failure tests 
Especially the last point is a new feature in error detection. The basic idea is, that 
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the signal behaviour is known in nearly every state of operation. Therefore it is pos-
sible to test whether or not the signal is in the range it should be according to the 
state of operation. Also during shut-down phases of the plant most of the sensors 
generate an output, e.g. noise or background, where the signal Ievei is definitely 
known and can be used for error detection. 
As shown in Fig. 3 there are comparators between the analog and the digital part of 
a measuring channel or redundancy. This precaution is especially intended for the 
detection of Common Mode failures between the diverse signal processing chan-
nels. According to the conventional analog system there are also comparators be-
tween the digital parts of the channels for detection of differences between the 
digital processing 
channels. 
The output from 
the digital signal 
processing unit 
can be assessed 
according to the 
different logic 
principles. But as 
already pointed 
out, they can not 
be used for initia-
tion of a safety ac-
tion yet. At the pre-
sent time it must be 
left open if this will 
also be the case in 
the future. There is 
a working group in 
the Nuclear Safety 
Standards Com-
mission, to find an 
answer to the 
question, under 
which conditions 
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ported systems could be accepted for safety actions. 
Fig. 3 shows the principle, how the system can be realised on the basis of the al-
ready proven technology, and being available in a 2 out of 3 Iay-out. This con-
figuration is also the standard example for the previous reliability analysis and can 
be seen as representative for the system in general. The system analysis is per-
formed on the basis given in the Fig. 4. The basic or reference safety action is the 
detection of a quench and the subsequent initiation of a current switch down upon 
demand. ln case of other safety actions the part of the measuring channels located 
prior to the comparators can slightly differ. ln Tab. 1 the components and the failure 
modes are listed. 
Tab. 1 Components and failure states 
Compo- States Name of component Failure 
nent description 
n=1,2,3 
LMn 1 Log. amplifier Signal to low 
2 Signal = const 
GSAn 1 Trip amplifier no reaction 
GSDn 
VGn 1 Camparator no reaction 
Mn 1 Magnet core element no reaction 
MDn 
AGn 1 Terminating unit no reaction 
Pn 1 Processor unit Hardware failure 
2 Software failure 
Mln 1 Cable, support lnterrupt 
AEAn 1 Analog input unit no reaction 
SKn 1 Detector Signal to low 
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Fault trees 
For different TOP-events (TOP is the top of the fault tree) the unavailability values 
will be analysed in relation to the reference event, the quench. 
TOP A is the unavailability of the initiation of a current switch down upon demand for 
ANALOG PART DIGITAL PART 
FIG. 5 FAULT TREE FüR THE SHUT DOWN ACTION INITIATED BY A QUENCH SIGNAL 
AS A TYPICAL INITIATION 
the classical analog part. 
TOP0 is the unavailability calculation for only the digital part of the system. As 
already pointed out this part of the system cannot be used for the initiation of 
a safety action. Therefore the result has to be considered with caution, as will 
be discussed later on. 
TOP 1 is the unavailability of the detection of one independent single failure in the 
alarm signal generation, analog and digital part included. 
TOP2 is the unavailability of the detection of an independent single failure in the 
alarm signal generation only for the digital part. This TOP event is also valid 
for the analog part because of the identical failure data. 
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TOP3 is the unavailability for the case that an error in the alarm signal generation in 
either the digital or the analog part of one redundancy will not be discovered. 
The components used in the fault tree calculation are listed in Tab. 2. For the signal 
generation and signal processing part the components from Tab. 1 are combined 
according to their location in reality in the portions, failures before and failures after 
the comparators. The comparators themselves can never prevent a demanded 
initiation signal. The comparaiors oniy play a role in error detection. The concentra-
tion of the number of single components to component groups allows a very high 
degree of simplification of the fault trees. Fig 5 shows the fault trees for the two 
TOP-events TOP A and TOP0 . The shape of both of the fault trees is identical. The 
difference is in the basic events, which in the one case only contains the analog 
part, in the other case only the digital part of the system. 
ln the analysis only those undetected components or component failures are 
included which can prevent, in case of a demand, an initiation of a safety action. lt is 
assumed, that all other component failures will be detected by the system and can 
be repaired in a few hours. The comparator failure do not play any role in view on 
the TOP-events TOP A and TOP0 . 
The fault trees for the TOP-events TOP1 and TOP2 for non detection of a failure in 
the alarm system are given in the Figs. 6 and 7. ln this case the comparator failures 
are the dominating events. 
ln case of Fig. 6 each channel, analog as weil as digital in one redundancy, is 
controlled by 3 comparators, e.g. analog channel one by VDA1, VAA1 ,2 and VAA1 ,3 
and digital channel one by VDA1, VDD1 and VDD3 etc. That means, each redun-
dancy will be controlled by 5 comparators. Camparator VDA1 is active in both chan-
nels, analog as weii as digital, of a channel group. This is a configuration which 
should Iead to a high availability concerning error detection. 
Fig. 7 shows the fault tree for the case (TOP}.) in which only the digital part of the 
system without assistance from the analog part is responsible for error detection. 
The same fault tree is also valid for the conventional part of the analog system, 
based on the assumption that the same version of comparators is used in the analog 
and in the digital part. That means no diversity of the comparators, which possibly 
should be avoided in the final design. But this question must be left open until a 






Fl G. 6 FAULT T RE E F 0 R ER R 0 R D ET E C TI 0 N IN 
ALARM SIGNAL GENERATION (DIGITAL AND ANALOG) 
FIG. 7 FAULT TREE FOR ERROR DETECTION IN 
ALARM SIGNAL GENERATION IN THE DIGI-
TAL PART OF THE SYSTEM 
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Tab. 2 Failure rates and failure states for the components 
Compo- State Failure Repair Description of failure 
nent rate time state 
n=1,2,3 [·10-6fh] [h] 
j=1,2,3 
1 10 5 Analog initiation channel 
"V 1-\ n befon:: comparator failure 
ANn 1 0.017 8760 Analog initiation channel 
after comparator failure 
DVn 1 7.33 8760 Digital initiation channel 
before comparator failure 
DNn 1 0.017 8760 Digital initiation channel 
after comparator failure 
Mn,j 1 0.003 8760 Magnet core element 
MDn,j 1 0.003 8760 failure 
VAAn 1 0.004 8760 Camparator A-A failure 
VDAn,j 1 0.004 8760 Camparator D-A failure 
VDDn 1 0.004 8760 Camparator D-D failure 
The TOP-event TOP3 is defined by: 
and is valid only for one redundancy. That means it occurs three times in a system. 
The index n represents the respective redundancy, according to the three independ-
ent redundant channels of a channel group. 
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Results of the analysis 
The results of the analysis are given in Tab. 3. The unavailability for the TOP A• of 
the protection system, the classical analog system, is evaluated as 1.2 · 1 o-7. This 
value is also the probability that the initiation of a signal for a safety action upon 
demand is not generated. The initiation signal is not available due to failures in the 
protection system. This is the order of magnitude expected and accepted for the Iay-
out. Here one has to keep in mind, that all other events, the events not influenced by 
the protection system, are of no interest in view of the analysis. 
Tab. 3 Results of the fault tree calculation 
Event Unavailability values 
[ per demand ] 
TOPA 1.2. 1 o-7 
TOP0 1.1 . 1 o-2 
TOP1 7.0. 10-36 
TOP2 3.7. 10-9 
TOP3 2.4·10-9 
Fig. 8 shows the blockdiagram for the analysis. ln the upper part of the diagram the 
combinations of the expected unavailability values of the different components are 
given. Each horizontal combination represents a failure of the whole system in case 
of a demanded safety action. 
The lower part of the diagram contains the failure probabi/ities. Values in the hori-
zontal lines, are multiplied, since they represent AND combinations, while the results 
of the lines will be added, which represent OR combinations. 
The diagram shows where the influences of the individual components to the overall 
unavailability comes from. The minor influence comes from the combinations of the 
magnet logic elements, e.g. Mn,j and MDn,j· Theseare the elements responsible for 
the logic evaluation on the logic Ievei. The combinations are in the lower part of the 
diagram, marked by a separate dashed box. Their unavailability value of 2 · 1 o-9 is 
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only 1. 7 % of the overall unavailability. 
The combinations 
of the analog part 
prior to the com-
parators AV n con-
tribute about 6 %, 
the combinations 
between AV n and 
ANn, the combina-
tions prior to and 
after the compara-
tors, about 37 % 
and the combina-
tions of ANn alone 
after the compara-
tors, have the larg-
est impact on the 
result, i.e. they 
contribute with 
about 55 %. As 
the failure rate of 
the components 
ANn is very low, 
the detectability of 
failures is also 
low. lt is assumed 
that a detection of 
a failure occurs 
only during the 
service inspection, 
which normally 
takes place once a 
year. During the 
normal test, that 
type of failure can 
not be detected 
FIG. 8 
BLOCKDIAGRAM FOR 







MAIN BLOCKDIAGRAM FOR THE UN-
AVAILABILITY OF THE PLANT PROTEC-
TION SYSTEM IN CASE OF A REPRE-
SENTATIVE SHUT DOWN INITIATION 
because it simulates a faultlass system. 
2.500 ·10 -9 
7.442 10 _g 
7.442' 10 -9 
2.215 ·10 -3 
2.500 10 -9 
7.442 10 -9 I. 186 ·I 0 -7 
7.442 '10 -9 
2.215 ·10 -3 
2.500 ·10 -9 
7.442 '10 -9 
7.442 '10 -9 
2.215 10-3 
6.901 10 -lü 
6.901 ·10- 10 
6.901 '10- 10 
1.20710-7 
2.070 10 _g 
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The unavailability of the digital part of TOP0 is, as expected, a few orders of magni-
tude higher namely 1.1 . 1 o-2. This value is dominated by the result of the failure 
probability of the microprocessor system. The block diagram is given in Fig. 9. lt has 
the same structure as Fig. 8. 
The difficulty arises 
from the fact, that 
there are a few er-
rors, which are not 
detectable by sys-
tematic tests. As al-
ready pointed out, 
the unavailability will 
be influenced by the 
failure detectability, 
expressed by the 
mean time to repair 
(MTTR), remernbar 
the product repair 
rate times MTTR is 
the expected un-
availability value. 
The high value of the 
unavailability for the 
components nDV de-
termines the result of 
the overall unavail-
ability of 1.1 . 1 o-2 
per demand. 
Fig. 1 0 shows the in-
fluence of the MTTR 
BLOCKDIAGRAM FOR 




FIG.9 MAIN BLOCKDIAGRAM FOR THE UN-
,WAILABILITY OF THE DIGITAL PART SYSTEM 
3.64 ·10 -J 
8.98 ·10 -6 
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3.64 ·10 -J 
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8.98 ·10-6 
2.22·10-a 
3.64 ·10 -J 
8.98 ·10 -6 
8.98 ·10 -6 
2.22 ·10 _, 
6.901 ·10- 10 
6.901 ·10- 10 
6.901·10- 10 
1.09 ·1 0 -2 
1.09 ·10- 2 
2.070 ·10-9 
on the unavailability upon demand. A reduction of the MTTR from 1 year to 1 month 
will result in a ~eduction of the overall unavailability by the factor 1.2 · 102. This 
shows evidently the influence of the failure detectability. A reduction of the MTTR to 
1 week brings the unavailability even down to about 5 . 1 o-6. That means by 
adequate precautions, there is still a potential for improvements in the system 
reliability. 
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lt is evident that a reduction of the failure rate of the microprocessor systemwill Iead 
to the same improvements. A combination of both effects would probably be the 
most desirable solution. 
..... 
I 
UNAVAILABILITY OF THE DYNAMIC SYSTEM 
0
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.-,-,.on,.,-.-.-.,onm 
100 2 3 2 3 4 56789102 2 3 4 567891o3 2 3 4 56789104 
MEAN TIME TO REPAIR [h] 
As already pointed out, the comparators are without any influence on the initiation of 
a safety action. They will be used for error detection in the analog as weil as in the 
digital part of the measuring channels and in the signal processing in the part of the 
system before the Iimit value control. According to Fig. 1 that is the initiation Ievei. 
The unavailability values for non detectability of an error, in the case of an error, is 
also given in Tab. 3. The value which results for TOP 1 = 7 · 1 o-36 for independent 
single failure is very low and is more of academic nature. lt shows however, that 
there is sufficient margin for uncertainties. 
TOP2 represents the unavailability of error detection in the analog as weil as the 
digital part independent of each other. The value is calculated to be 3. 7 · 1 o-9. 
The unavailability for the TOP3 is calculated to be 2.4 · 1 o-9. This is the unavailabil-
ity for the individual channels in one redundancy, i.e., either the analog or the digital 
part. Based on the assumption, that the two different measuring and processing 
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channels are diverse in the Iay-out, the TOP-event can be set equal to the result of 
TOP3 for the Common Mode risk. 
Conclusions 
The advantage of the protection system under consideration compared to the con-
ventional systems is the improvement in the failure detectability. New in the present 
system is the on-line testability of the measuring chains including the sensors and 
the high safety against Common Modes. The on-line test is based on the assumption 
that the sensor signal Ievei is known and can be tested during each shut-down and 
during the operating phase. The high reliability for the initiation of a safety action is 
based on the proven classical technology. Further improvements in the failure 
detectability will be achieved by combination with a microprocessor supported new 
digital system. The transfer of safety functions to the digital microprocessor system 
is not considered here. According to the current safety regulations this would not be 
accepted due to problems in the proof of digital systems reliability. This might 
change, however, in the future. 
The protection system was designed to cope with the reference event, the quench. 
But it is quite obvious, that the basic concept of the system is also applicable for 
initiations of safety actions in general in a fusion power plant. 
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Appendix A 
The Common Mode problern 
Common Modes in the analog or in the digital part of the systemwill be detected by 
the comparators in between the two systems. One open point is a Common Mode in 
the comparators (VDA according to Fig. 4). lf that cannot be prevented from the 
beginning, for their diversification might become necessary. But this is not a major 
problem. At present this question will be left open. 
Keeping the risk acceptably low in this domain is still very important and is a domi-
nating part of safety discussions, in relation to power stations in general. 
ln the handbook of the human reliability [3], which is one of the references for the 
present considerations, the problern of dependencies of different degrees in view of 
human actions is the most important part of [3]. 
The occurrence probability for Common Modes in the protection system, as it was 
postulated in WASH-1400 is, as we believe, not transferable to the procedures used 
in the German reactor plants. The reason is, there are differences in the Iay-out, in 
the service and maintenance strategy and in the administrative precautions. 
lt is written in [3] concerning the calibration procedure: 
..... In this situation, a technician is checking the calibration of a series of set points 
consisting of the tree comparators. To do this, he must first set up some test equip-
ment, and he could make an error in this initial set-up. For example, he could select 
the wrang decade resistance, set up the wrang scale on the decade, or make some 
other errors in the test set-up. Unless corrected, such an error will result in miscali-
bration of a/1 three comparators. 
The problemwas evaluated in WASH-1400, p 11-101. Fig. 7-3 presents the event tree 
diagram for this task. In this evaluation, a probability of 1 o-2 was estimated for the 
common cause failure of a miscalibration due to faulty set-up. This estimate was 
modified by recovery factors as follows: it was reasoned that when the technician 
discovered that the calibration of the first setpoint had to be changed, he would 
change it. It was further reasoned that when he found that the second setpointalso had 
to be changed, 90 % of the time he would be suspicious, would recheck his test set-up 
and discover his error. Ten percent of the time he would not be suspicious, and, give 
that he had this unsuspicious nature, it was judged that the conditional probability of 
the third error (i.e., failing to be become suspicious when he has to recalibrate the 
-20-
third set-point) was 1.0. This is, CD was assumed between the last two tasks. Thus, the 
Joint probability of error in calibrating the three setpoints was 
.01 X 1.0x .1 X 1.0 = 10-3 ..... 
ln the fault tree analysis in [2] p. 11-101 (but also p. IV-19) for a failure of the reactor 
protection system a value of 3 . 1 o-5 is reported. This is based on the assumption 
that for missing the reactor protection function at least two independent groups of 
initiation channels have to be miscalibrated. ln this case it is supposed that for the 
upper Iimit there exist a complete dependency (CD) between the two groups, for the 
lower Iimit it is supposed a complete independence (zero dependence (ZO)) between 
the two groups. The upper Iimit Pu becomes: 
Pu= P1 1\ P2' = 1.0 · 10-3 · 1.0 = 1.0 · 10-3 
the lower Iimit PL: 
PL = P1 1\ P2" = 1.0 · 10-3 · 1.0 · 10-3 = 1.0. 10-6 
P 1 is the probability for miscalibration of the first channel. 
P2' is the probability for miscalibration of the second channel in case of complete 
dependency. 
P2" is the probability for miscalibration of the second channel in case of complete 
independence. 
Because of the assumption of a log normal distribution the median Pm becomes: 
ln [2] p. 111-66 it is explained, that because of personnel redundancy a sizeable 
reduction of the failure probability could be reached. 
For calibration work one can achieve values of 1 o-5 for the probability of a miscali-
bration [A. D. Swain takes the view, that probabilities in connection with human 
actions never could reach values lower than 1 o-5 (?)]. Values of 1 o-5 are possible if 
the calibration procedure is carried out by a two person team. One person reads and 
writes the check-list, while the second person does the calibration work. After that, 
the procedure becomes reversed, the second person reads and writes while the first 
calibrates. By the assumptions, supposed in [2,3], one can suppose, that this proce-
dure was not being used at the time of WASH-1400 in general in US power stations. 
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Concerning the calibration, service and maintenance procedures in German power 
stations, one must distinguish between the first calibration and later or periodical 
tests of the once set values (here the reference is Biblis). The first calibration is nec-
essary when the set-point is set for the first time, e. g. before the first start up of a 
new plant, after a replacement, and after a demanded change of a set-point. All set-
points are rechecked systematically every three months and after each shut down 
period exceeding two days. For first calibrations as weil as for periodical tests the 
calibration procedure is performed by two persans using two different calibration 
meters, calibrated by an independent calibration service. Partly there is also an 
independent expert from the TÜV (Technischer Überwachungsverein) with them, 
authorised from the licensing authorities, before the first start up and once a year 
during the annual general inspection (normally during refuelling). For the first cali-
bration as weil as for the periodical inspections the identical calibration procedure 
and the calibration meters are prescribed. 
Normally during the first calibration, the first person reads the calibration instruc-
tions. The second person sets the set-point. The first person writes the setted value 
down in the instructions beside the prescribed value. After that, the procedure is 
reversed. The whole calibration procedure is observed by a representative of the 
TÜV. 
The procedure during the periodical inspection is the same. The measured values 
are written beside the nominal value in the instructions. lf there is a difference 
between the instruction and the two measured values (from the two persons), !arger 
than 10 mVto 20 mV (0.1 to 0.2%), then the calibration team is authorised to make a 
correction, but the new value has to be documented as the third value in the instruc-
tion sheet (Anderungsvermerk). The TÜV must always be informed of such correc-
tions. 
lf the differences are I arger than 20 m V, then the case is put into the class of repair 
procedures. The calibration team is not authorised to make correction. From a repair 
team an independent check is made and if the result is equal to the result of the 
calibration team, the calibration procedure is equal to the first setting. ln this case 
the licensing authorities must be informed. 
According to [3] Tab. 14-2 and 11-3 the probability (for human errors), that a miscali-
bration is not discovered or a calibration instruction not correctly used is, approxi-
mately equal to A = 1 o-3, with a lower Iimit XL = 0.5 · 1 o-3 , and an upper Iimit 
Xu = 5.0 · 1 o-3. ln each case, there is a check of the actual calibration value by a 
second person and by a second calibration meter, where it is supposed, that this 
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second person is very experienced. The check procedure of the first step can not be 
seen independently from the first calibration step, because both steps are followed 
by each other and the calibration instructions are the same. 
The probability of B, that a miscalibration is not discovered therefore has to lie in 
between the Iimits of complete dependence and complete independence. lf a lognormal 
distribution is assumed, the lower Iimit becomes XL = (A)2 = 1 o-6 and the upper Iimit 
Xu = A · 1.0 = 1 o-3. The probability, that the set-point is miscalibrated becomes : 
According to [3] Tab. 15-1 the probability for B could be taken as 1 o-2. ln this case 
one gets: 
Pm = A A B = 1 . 0 · 1 o-s. 
This value should be adopted, because it seems to be more realistic. This conside-
ration is valid for the setting of the first value in general. For the checking or setting 
of the second set-point, in the two or more redundant channels of a channel group, 
one has to distinguish between the three cases; 
1: An initial (first) or new setting of all of the set-points of a group. 
A (first) setting of one or more set-points after a repair or exchange of a 
channel. The criterion here is, that in the channel group under consideracc 
tion one or more channels remain as previously set. 
Check of the setting, e. g. in the frame of periodical inspection. ln this case 
normally a re calibration is not necessary. 
ln 1, the probability for a miscalibration is the largest. Because if miscalibration 
of the first set-point occurs also the following set-points will be miscalibrated with 
high a probability. 
2 lies in between one and three. But probably it will tend more to case three, 
because in case two there is still a reference available. lf a difference is discovered, 
with a high probability, the whole group will be checked once more and the probabil-
ity is also high, that the miscalibration will be discovered and corrected, in a way as 
described previously. 
ln 3 the probability is lowest. lf the first technician discovers a discrepancy 
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relative to the nominal set-point, the second technician will cross-check the set-
point. There is a certain probability that they will become suspicious and recheck the 
tested value once more. Remember that the technicians may only make corrections 
in the range 0.1 to 0.2 % of the nominal set-point. Otherwise they must report this 
disagreement and a repair or an exchange procedure is started. 
Therefore, in Case 1, the probability that the second or further channels of a group 
will be miscalibrated, given that the first channel already is miscalibrated could be 
set equal 1. ln this case it is very difficult to imagine any facts which could motivate 
the technician to become doubtful after the first setting and recheck ihis setting once 
more, because the second and higher chains are also new to calibrate, and the in 
other cases 2 and 3 existing reference, is not available. 
ln Case 2 is a lower probability than in the American study [3] seem likely (C = 0.1) 
because of the personnel redundancy and the restriction, that a correction of the 
setting outside the Iimits defined previously is not permitted. The probability for 
discovering the miscalibration will be set equal to the upper Iimit for miscalibration of 
the first value according to the assumption of complete dependency with C = 0.001. 
ln Case 3 the same probability as already pointed out is assumed with C = 0.001. 
The second as weil as the third case seem tobe pessimistic, because of the admin-
istrative difficulty of re calibration of a once set value. There is a cross-check by a 
third independent person before the recalibration procedure can take place. 
One can agree with the opinion, that the third miscalibrated set-point will not be dis-
covered, when the miscalibration was also not discovered in the former two. That 
means D = 1.0. Calculating the overall probability one gets: 
P{CMA} = P{A 1\ B 1\ C 1\ D} 
the probability for the case, that all of the three (from three) channels of a channel 
group will be miscalibrated. 
For the postulated three cases one can calculate the probabilities P{CMA}n substitu-




P{CMAh = 1.0 · 10-s · 1.0 · 10-o · 1.0 = 1.0 · 10-s 
P{CMAb = 1.0 . 1 o-s . 1.0 . 1 o-3 . 1.0 = 1.0 . 1 o-8 
P{CMA}3 = 1.0. 10-s ·1.0. 10-3 . 1.0 = 1.0. 10-8 
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Case 3 is the normal case and here the probability should be lower than in Case 2, 
because it is limited to measuring and documenting but a correction of the setting is 
a new procedure. Considering the first case, which is the critical one, more in detail, 
the following question comes up: "Under which conditions is a miscalibration possi-
ble?" The answer is: ''Miscalibrations are possible if both calibration meters are 
incorrectly set, if the calibration instructions are incorrect or if the channel group to 
calibrate is not the correct one, e.g. ifthe Iabels to identifo the group arenot correct." 
Forthis type of errors one can assums a complete dependency between occurrence 
of an error and the occurrence of a miscalibration, that means, the higher value of 
both probabilities each, gives the value. The probability for a wrong reference value 
in the calibration instruction is very low to classify due to the extended administrative 
procedure. First a set-point is chosen and justified. Than multiple tests are 
performed by different persans and organisations and at the end by the independent 
expert, the TÜV on behave of the licensing authority. ln addition the operating 
experience from other plants and from the manufacturer are also incorporated. 
Nevertheless, only a three Ievei process for estimating the failure probability should 
be supposed. But data about that, can only be generated by transfer from other 
procedures. According to [3] p. 14-7 the probability for the first miscalibration is set 
equal to 3.0 · 1 o-3. The first documented value will be checked and according to the 
first setting one can assume that the probability (8 = 1.0 · 1 o-2) has a certain 
dependence, e. g. the same working team, the identical sources etc., therefore the 
same value is assumed. The check by the independent expert (TÜV) can be 
assumed as completely independent from the other two events and therefore one 
can take the same probability value than in step 1. From this a probability for a 
wrong calibration instruction results according to the relation: 
P{CMA} = 3.0. 10-3. 1.0. 10-2.3.0. 10-3 ~ 1.0. 10-7 
By the assumptions made there is a tendency to the safe side, which means that the 
value is pessimistic. 
A miscalibration of the two calibration meters at the sametime seems tobe still more 
unprobable than the probability of wrang calibration instructions. The calibration 
meters are subjected to a certain quality assurance and only permitted for use of 
calibration in the reactor protection area. All of the meters are checked annually ac-
cording to special standards by an independent calibration service outside the plant. 
Approximately the same order of magnitude may be assumed for wrang or mislead-
ing labelling of a channel group. Here it is also the personnel redundancy, two 
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technicians and an independent expert, which makes the occurrence probability very 
low. 
The considerations until now are only valid for the first calibration. But before the 
first start up, there will be an additional check of the set-points. ln this way with a 
high probability existing errors will be discovered. A recognition of larger differences, 
as pointed out earlier, results not in recalibration, but in a repair procedure, which 
starts with an analysis of the origin for the necessary repair. At the exchange of one 
channel in a group, the correct calibrated ones remain in the group. A difference in 
the signal Ievei in the different channels of a group is observed and will be discov-
ered by comparison of the signals. 
The previous consideration allows one to conclude that the probability of a miscali-
bration of all channels of an initiation channel group in the reactor protection system 
is very low. That means, that the risk due to the Common Mode problem, could be 
kept so low, that it loses its dominating character. 
References according to the reference Iist on page 18. 
